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(({T]he Board noted that the NLRB is not intended to be (a forum in 
which to rectify all the injustices of the workplace. "'1 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 2005 marks the seventieth anniversary of the passage of the 
Wagner Act.2 Although most celebrations and festivities will await the 
centennial anniversary, it is an appropriate time to consider what role the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the Act")3 plays in the current law 
of the workplace and what the future holds for the oldest labor law in the 
United States. Such consideration seems warranted particularly in light of 
recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the 
Board"). One possible role for the NLRA is that it could be interpreted 
broadly as establishing important workplace rights and protections for both 
union and nonunion employees. An alternative possibility is that the Act 
could be interpreted narrowly as applying almost exclusively to the 
declining population of union workers in the United States,4 and 
restrictively even as to them. Either role is possible, and which of the two 
prevails depends largely upon how the National Labor Relations Board 
interprets section 7 of the NLRA. 5 Section 7 sets out the basic rights under 
the Act. It reads, in relevant part: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have 
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .  6
Just three years ago, I wrote an article in which I argued that the 
NLR.A, based on the National Labor Relations Board 's interpretations, 
I. Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662, at *3 n. l 5  (Oct. 15, 2004) 
(quoting Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882,888 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)). 
2. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 499 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 15 1-69 (2004)). 
3 .  The current National Labor Relations Act is the Wagner Act, as amended by ch. 120 of the 
Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, 61  Stat. 136 (1947), and the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 5 1 9  (1959). 
4. The percentage of employees in the United States represented by unions has declined from a 
peak in the early 1950s of approximately 36% of the workforce. See Right-to-Work Advocates Mark 
Labor Day with Calls for Repeal of National Labor Law, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-l l 
(Sept. 2, 2005). The current level is about 12.5% of the workforce and 7.9% of the private workforce. 
Union Membership Rate Dropped in 2004 to 12.5 Percent, Continuing 20-Year Decline, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at AA-1 (Jan. 28, 2005). ln 1983, the first year for which the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics has comparable data, the level of union membership was 20.1 %. Jd. 
5.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
6. !d. 
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could be an important source of rights and protections for nonunion 
workers. 7 I asserted that an expansive interpretation of the Act was needed 
and desirable because the NLRA' s section 7 rights, when applied to 
nonunion workers, provide important general protections not available 
under other laws. Although some of the section 7 rights are linked to 
unions and collective bargaining, employees who are neither members of a 
union nor seeking to be represented by a union can engage in conduct 
protected by section 7 when their conduct is 1) concerted and 2) for the 
purpose of mutual aid or protection. 8 Whereas other individual employment 
laws9 protect certain specific rights, the NLRA protects the general right of 
employees to engage in unspecified concerted activity for mutual aid or 
protection.10 I argued in my previous article that this general section 7 right 
could do more to protect workers than the effort to pass new state or federal 
legislation not only because it is increasingly difficult to enact such 
legislation in a globally competitive world but also because participating in 
concerted activity empowers employees to speak up to their employers and 
to engage with them on key aspects of the employment relationship. 
At the time I wrote that article, the NLRB' s decisions interpreting 
section 7 seemed to permit coverage of a broad range of employee conduct 
regardless of whether employees were represented by a·union. However, in 
the short period since my original article, several NLRB decisions have 
shifted the law under the NLRA toward a more restrictive, pro-employer 
interpretation of section 7.11 Three recent Board decisions, considered 
7. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Eve1ything Old 
Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259 (2002). 
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, I 1 02- 1 1 04 ( 1962); Abramson, 
LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 2005 WL 2094298, at *3 (Aug. 26, 2005). Although those two requirements 
may be more easily satisfied when employees are represented by a union, they also may be satisfied 
when no union represents employees. See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248 ( 1997). 
The statutory phrase "for . . .  mutual aid or protection" has generally been interpreted to mean that there 
must be a connection between the conduct and the interests of the employees as employees. See Eastex 
v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556 (1 978). Thus, whether the requirement is satisfied is usually determined by 
how closely the conduct is connected with working conditions. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN & 
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
§ 1 6.3 (1 976). Even when conduct satisfies the dual requirements of "concerted" and "for mutual aid or 
protection," that conduct may lose its protected status if it is too violent, disruptive, or disloyal to the 
employer. /d.; see also NLRB v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard 
Broadcasting), 346 U.S. 464, 471-72 ( 1 953) (finding employees conduct to be "detrimentally disloyal"); 
Calvin William Sharpe, "By Any Means Necessary"-Unprotected Conduct and Decisional Discretion 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 209-10 (1 999). 
9. This category includes all federal employment laws other than the NLRA. 
10. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension 
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 575 (1992) (discussing the individual rights approach to workplace law compared with the 
collective approach); Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual 
Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REv. 687 ( 1997). 
I I. This trend has not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., Paul Galligan, New Directions for the NLRB: 
Further erosion of Clinton-era rulings is probable, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, at 9; NLRB Continues to 
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together, cause me to reach this conclusion: IBM Corp. , 12 Holling Press, 
Inc. ,13 and Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia Home, Inc. ("Lutheran 
Heritage"). 14 Each of these decisions changes an aspect of the law that I 
discussed in my earlier article. 
While only IBM Corp. clearly overrules Board precedent, holding that 
the Weingarten right does not apply to nonunion employees, Holling Press 
and Lutheran Heritage also represent important changes in the law. 
Lutheran Heritage alters the Board's analysis of whether it is an unfair 
labor practice for employers to maintain rules prohibiting aggressive or 
hostile speech by employees. Holling Press, potentially the most limiting 
of the three decisions, narrowly interprets the statutory requirement that 
conduct be "for the purpose of . .. mutual aid or protection"15 in order to 
gain protection under section 7. Although Holling Press and Lutheran 
Heritage involved unionized employees, the principles they articulate are 
likely to have a more pronounced effect in removing section 7 protection 
from nonunion employees. Union workers can more easily satisfy the 
section 7 requirements of "concertedness" and "for mutual aid or 
protection" than nonunion employees, and, even if such requirements are 
not satisfied, union employees may still be covered by the other section 7 
rights relating to collective bargaining. 
A common theme in the three decisions is that each discusses, to 
differing degrees, the employer's right and obligation, on pain of potential 
legal liability, to maintain a harassment-free, civil, and safe workplace. To 
enable employers to achieve this obviously important objective, the 
decisions narrowly interpret employee rights under section 7. In IBM Corp. 
and Lutheran Heritage, the Board limited employees' ability to claim 
protection under section 7 in part out of its concern that employers should 
be able to conduct investigations and maintain rules that help them avoid 
liability for harassment. Ironically, the Board in Holling Press held that 
section 7 did not protect an employee pursuing a state law sexual 
harassment claim when she aggressively sought the assistance of a co­
employee as a witness. I find it troubling that the agency charged with 
interpreting and enforcing the NLRA would read it so narrowly in order to 
avoid potential conflict with other laws (principally employment 
discrimination laws)16 and in order to create a kinder, gentler workplace. 
Make Changes, Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH), No. 890, Issue 1405 (Feb. 23, 2005); Ross Runkel, NLRB 
Reversals During the Bush Administration, Employment Law Memo, 
http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/nlrbreversals.htm, (last visited on Oct. 18, 2005). 
12. 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742 (June 9, 2004). 
13. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662 (Oct. 15, 2004). 
14. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 (Nov. 19, 2004). 
15. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (2006). 
16. See Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting the 
Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 605-08 (2005). 
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IBM Corp. , Holling Press, and Lutheran Heritage have sparked debate 
about the proper role of the NLRA in the workplace and the role of the 
Board in interpreting the Act. Some commentators argue that the NLRB 's  
recent cases substantially narrow the coverage and protections of the Act, 17 
while others argue that the reversals do not signify anything significant.18 
Indeed, Board members themselves disagree about the potential 
ramifications of their actions and whether their decisions aggressively 
overrule precedent.19 
It is, admittedly, a precarious endeavor to make broad assertions about 
the movement of an area of the law based on decisions rendered over a 
short period of time, especially because the law of the Board changes 
frequently, depending in significant part on its political composition.20 
Nevertheless, I undertake such a task in this article out of a sense of 
obligation. The recent trends, decisions, and appointments at the NLRB21 
indicate that the NLRA' s future as a source of rights and protections for 
nonunion workers will be insignificant at best. Moreover, the Board's 
17. Union, Management Attorneys Disagree On Significance of Recent NLRB Rulings, Daily L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. I 03, at C-1 (May 3 1 ,  2005) (reporting the comments of AFL-CIO General Counsel Jon 
Hiatt); Galligan, supra note II, at 9 (reviewing decisions reversing or narrowing interpretations by the 
Clinton Board and making predictions regarding possible future reversals); Susan J. McGolrick, AFL­
CJO Counsel, Management Attorney Both Fault New Direction of Labor Board, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 1 9, at A-7 (Jan. 3 1 ,  2005) (reporting comments of Jon Hiatt and Professor Samuel Estreicher). 
18. Kenneth R. Dolin, Bush-Era NLRB Rulings, NAT'L L.J., June 13 ,  2005, at 1 3  (arguing that 
recent Board decisions can be characterized as applying established principles and standards); Union, 
Management Attorneys Disagree On Significance of Recent NLRB Rulings, supra note 1 7; see also 
Robert J. Battista, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, Remarks at 58th NYU Annual 
Conference on Labor (May 20, 2005), reprinted in NLRB Chairman Battista's Speech at New York 
University's Labor Conference, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at E-1 (May 23, 2005). 
19. See John Herzfeld, Members Schaumber, Liebman Discuss Differing Views on Recent Board 
Decisions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 0  (March 1 0, 2005) (discussing comments of two Board 
members at an American Bar Association Conference). 
20. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. The Board consists of five members appointed 
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate for staggered five-year terms. 29 U.S.C. § !53( a) 
(2006). By custom and practice, three members are of the same political party as the President, and two 
are of the other party. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the 
NLRB, 1935-2000,61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 3 6 1 ,  1372 n.41 (2000). 
21. The Board now is at full strength with five members. On August 3 1 ,  2005, the President 
appointed Member Peter Schaumber to a recess appointment on the Board. Susan J. McGolrick, 
Schaumber Gets NLRB Recess Appointment; White House Nominates New USCJS Director, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1 69 (Sept. I, 2005). Member Schaumber, a Republican, will serve until the Senate 
adjourns its 2006 session. On January 4, 2006, the President appointed Peter N. Kirsanow, a 
Republican, to a recess appointment. Kirsanow Appointment Pleases Business, But Democrats, AFL­
CJO Criticize Action, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at AA-1 (Jan. 6, 2006). On January 1 7, 2006, 
President Bush filled the last Board vacancy with the recess appointment of Dennis Walsh, a Democrat, 
a term that ends when the Senate adjourns in 2007. See Walsh Named in Recess Appointment to Fill 
Board's Remaining Vacancy, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. II, at A-12 (Jan. 1 8, 2006). In most of the 
Board decisions discussed in this article, Member Schaumber joined Chairman Battista and Member 
Meisburg in the majority while Members Liebman and Walsh dissented (Members Meisburg and Walsh 
were not on the panel in Holling Press). 
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restrictive interpretation of section 7 will gradually diminish the rights and 
protections for unionized employees as well. 
Because of the Board's actions and the changing nature of the law, my 
earlier recommendations and predictions are now questionable. Thus, this 
article hopes to call attention to what I think is an alarming trend in the 
Board's decisions. Although the law under the NLRA may change again as 
the composition of the Board changes, I am concerned that a vision of the 
NLRA as part of the overall law of the workplace in the United States may 
fade and be replaced by a view that the Act is just the labor law that applies 
to unionized workers. 
The following sections discuss the IBM Corp., Holling Press, and 
Lutheran Heritage decisions and consider their possible ramifications. I 
conclude that the decisions narrow the NLRA in significant ways for both 
union and nonunion employees. Unfortunately, the Board's narrow 
construction of the NLRA minimizes the Act's role in the overall labor and 
employment law regime of this nation. Just three years ago, I thought it had 
greater potential. 
II. 
IBM CORP.: NARROWING THE WEINGARTENRIGHT 
The Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. that an employer 
commits an unfair labor practice when it denies an employee's request to 
have a union representative present at an investigatory interview that the 
employee reasonably believes may result in discipline. 22 According to the 
Court, this right emanates from section 7 of the NLRA's protection of 
activity that is concerted and for mutual aid or protection. The Weingarten 
Court left it to the Board to address a question that has spawned five 
decisions and four changes of law over a twenty-two year period: whether 
employees who are not represented by a union have a similar right to be 
accompanied by a co-employee at an investigatory interview that might 
result in discipline. 
In the first decision to address this question, Materials Research Corp., 
the Board held that the Weingarten right does extend to nonunion 
employees.23 Three years later in Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Board reversed 
its position, holding that the Weingarten right is not rooted in section 7 and 
does not extend to nonunion employees.24 Three years after Sears, the 
Board modified its position again in E.I. DuPont De Nemours.25 There, the 
Board held that non-application of the Weingarten right to nonunion 
22. 420 u.s. 25 1 ( 1 975). 
23. 262 N.L.R.B. 1 0 1 0  ( 1982). 
24. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 ( 1 985). 
25. 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (I 988). 
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employees is a pennissible but not a mandatory interpretation of the NLRA, 
and it chose to adhere to nonextension of the right.26 Subsequently, in 
Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio27 the Board overturned Sears and 
DuPont and restored its holding in Materials Research: the Weingarten 
right emanates from section 7 and is "equally applicable" regardless of 
whether the employee requesting accompaniment in the interview is 
represented by a union. The Board explained that extending the 
Weingarten right to nonunion employees "effectuates the policy that 
'Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no wise [sic] 
dependent on union representation for their implementation. "'28 
Most recently, in IBM Corp., the Board changed its position on this 
issue for a fourth time.29 It overruled Epilepsy Foundation and returned to 
its DuPont holding. Either interpretation of the NLRA is permissible, 
stated the Board, but it chose, on policy grounds, not to extend the 
Weingarten right to unrepresented employees. In IBM Corp. the employer 
interviewed several employees in connection with an investigation about a 
charge of harassment made by a former contract employee. After the 
employer conducted a few interviews, some employees detennined that 
they had a right to have a co-employee present as a witness in future 
interviews. These employees discovered they had this right through 
different means. For example, a suspended manager (and former military 
officer) advised one interviewee that, based on his military experience, the 
employee should ask for a witness at such interviews. Another employee 
said he "searched the web" and determined that he had a right to have a 
representative present. 30 
The employer denied the workers' requests to have a co-employee 
present. In fact, the supervisor conducting the interviews denied that the 
employees even requested accompaniment at the interviews.31 However, 
the employees filed a unfair labor practice charge and the administrative 
law judge who initially heard the case found that they made such requests 
and that their requests were denied.32 Relying on Epilepsy Foundation, the 
ALJ found that the employer violated section 8(a)( l )  of the Act,33 which 
26. Jd. at 630-3 1 .  
27. 3 3 1  N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), ajJ'd in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1905 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ), cert. denied, 
536 u.s. 904 (2002). 
28. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio, 3 3 1  N.L.R.B. at 678 (quoting Glomac Plastics, Inc., 
234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1 3 1 1 (1978)). 
29. 34 1 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at * 10-12  (June 9, 2004). 
30. Id. at *37-40. 
31 . Id. at *40. 
32. Jd. at *I. 
33. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to- (1 ) interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157  of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1 58(a)(l )  
(2006). 
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makes it an unfair labor practice to interfere with the exercise of rights 
guaranteed by section 7. 
A. The Majority: Policies-Increasing Need for Workplace Investigations 
and the Jeopardy Posed by Extending the Weingarten Right 
The Board majority overruled the ALJ and reversed course from 
Epilepsy Foundation. Returning to its holding in DuPont, the Board frrst 
stated the Act can be interpreted to either extend or deny the Weingarten 
right to employees not represented by a union.34 The Board then chose to 
withhold the Weingarten right from non-union workers, thereby reversing 
Epilepsy Foundation. The Board reasoned that the "ever-increasing 
requirements to conduct workplace investigations"35 brought about by 
changes in the laws prohibiting workplace discrimination and sexual 
harassment, the rise in incidents of workplace violence, and the events of 
September 11, 2001, made extending the right imprudent. 36 In light of the 
increasing need to conduct investigations, the Board found that the policy 
concerns expressed in DuPont all counseled against giving nonunion 
employees the right to have co-workers present at investigatory interviews. 
Specifically, the Board focused on the fact that co-workers, unlike union 
representatives, do not represent the interests of the entire workforce, do not 
level the power imbalance between employer and employee, do not have 
the skills of union representatives, and increase the chances that 
confidential information will be compromised.37 
B. The Concurrence: Proving Section 7 Coverage 
and Common Law Prerogatives of Employers 
In his concurrence, Member Schaumber agreed with the majority on 
the policy rationale for overturning Epilepsy Foundation, but he gave 
additional reasons for denying the Weingarten right to nonunion employees. 
He argued that Epilpesy Foundation was wrongly decided because it 
presumed the concerted nature of the conduct rather than requiring 
additional proof of concertedness. 38 Member Schaumber claimed that in 
Epilepsy Foundation, the Board erroneously presumed that nonunion 
employees satisfied the section 7 requirements of concertedness and action 
"for mutual aid or protection" whenever they requested accompaniment 
merely because Weingarten held that similar requests made by union 
employees satisfied both provisions of section 7. Although Member 
34. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 1 48, 2004 WL 1 335742, at *2 (June 9, 2004). 
35. /d. at *3. 
36. /d. at *6. 
37. /d. at *6-8. 
38. /d. at * 1 9  (Schaumber, Member, concuning). 
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Schaumber mentioned the two requirements, he focused his criticism of 
Epilepsy Foundation on its presumption of concertedness when a nonunion 
employee requests the presence of a co-worker at an interview. He claimed 
that the Board in Epilepsy Foundation had relied on a discredited analysis 
of concertedness from the Alleluia Cushion39 decision rather than on the 
correct analysis outlined in the controlling Board precedent of Meyers II.40 
The requirements of concertedness and for mutual aid or protection are 
separate and distinct requirements, emphasized Member Schaumber, and he 
argued that each must be proved using the appropriate analysis.41 
Thus, Member Shaumber claimed that asking a co-worker to attend an 
investigatory interview was not necessarily concerted activity protected by 
section 7. Additionally, he contended that in the absence of a collective 
bargaining agreement, management has a "common law right" to deal with 
employees on an individual basis and that extending Weingarten to 
nonunion employees violates this rightY By requiring separate proof for 
the concertedness and mutual aid prongs of section 7 and then by narrowly 
defining what qualifies as concerted, Member Shaumber leaves little room 
for the NLRA to function outside of a union setting. As I will discuss 
below, the Board majority in Holling Press, would further limit the reach of 
the Act by narrowly interpreting what qualifies as "for mutual aid or 
protection. "43 
C. 
The Dissent: Making the NLRA Less Applicable 
to Nonunion Workers 
The dissent by Members Liebman and Walsh recognized that 
overturning Epilepsy Foundation would make the NLRA less relevant in 
the contemporary workplace and deny nonunion employees a right that 
might have some value to them. Initially observing that "[t]he decision to 
overrule a recent precedent, carefully reasoned and upheld in the courts, 
should be based on far more compelling reasons than our colleagues have 
articulated,"44 the dissent questioned whether the majority had made a 
convincing case that extending the Weingarten right to nonunion workers 
would significantly interfere with the increasing number of investigations 
required or encouraged by other laws. Even assuming such a case were 
established, the dissent questioned why, in balancing the section 7 rights of 
39. 22 1 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). 
40. 28 1 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 148 1  (D.C. Cir. 1 987), 
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). 
41. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at *22 (June 9, 2004) (Schaumber, 
Member, concurring). 
42. /d. at * l 7. 
43. See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text. 
44. IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at *32 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, dissenting). 
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the NLRA against employers' concerns under other laws, the NLRA 
categorically must lose.45 The dissent also challenged Member 
Schaumber's analysis of the concertedness requirement, arguing that he 
incorrectly interpreted Epilepsy Foundation and Materials Research as 
being based on a rejected view of concerted activity and that he erred in his 
analysis of how Meyers II applies to a nonunion employee requesting 
accompaniment. 46 
D. Critique ofiBM Corp. 
The IBM Corp. dissent establishes the starting point for critiquing the 
majority's opinion, namely whether the policy concerns cited by the 
majority have, as the Board stated, taken on new vitality. The majority 
wrote of changes in the workplace in recent years, 47 a period it left 
undefined, and stated that the need for investigatory interviews had 
increased since Weingarten. However, workplace changes since 
Weingarten do not seem to be relevant. Not only did the Board not suggest 
that such changes made the right of union employees less compelling, but 
the Board failed to explain what workplace conditions had changed since 
Epilepsy Foundation, the Board's most recent case on the issue. Regardless 
of the time period to which the Board referred or should have referred, the 
rationale of changed conditions and increased need for workplace 
investigations rings hollow. Laws prohibiting sex discrimination and 
harassment in the workplace, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,48 existed long before the Board in Materials Research Corp. first 
extended the Weingarten right in the nonunion context. If the need to 
conduct investigations into allegations of harassment counseled against 
extension of the Weingarten right then why did the Board in Materials 
Research even reach the decision that it did? 
Perhaps the IBM Corp. majority meant that court decisions on sexual 
harassment since DuPont or Epilepsy Foundation emphasized the need for 
prompt and effective investigations of sexual harassment,49 but it did not 
say that. In fact, court cases have long established that employers need to 
investigate and promptly and effectively address complaints alleging sexual 
45. /d. at *33. 
46. /d. at •32. 
47. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at *6 (June 9, 2004). 
48. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-
15) (2004). 
49. The most obvious example would be the analytical framework for harassment perpetrated by 
supervisors announced by the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 
(1998) (holding employers strictly liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors that results in 
a tangible employment action, but providing employers with an affirmative defense to harassment that 
does not result in a tangible employment action), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
805-06 (1998) (same). 
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harassment. Thus, it is difficult to understand the Board's concern about 
changes in the law increasing the need for prompt investigations of sexual 
harassment. The Board's concern with workplace violence also rings 
hollow. Perhaps the number of incidents of workplace violence has 
increased in recent years, but the Board did not substantiate that assertion. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that more investigations are being performed 
based on any such increase. 
The invocation of 9/11 is the most unusual reason given by the Board 
for the increase in workplace investigations. It seems that the reference to 
9/11 is simply a mantra: mention the tragedy of 9/11 and everyone accepts 
that the world has changed and that any modifications made in reaction to 
that changed world are justified.5° Certainly, the Board's use of 9/11 as a 
basis for limiting the Weingarten right is not the only time that tragedies 
and national security have been used to justify a limitation of legal rights, 51 
but it may be the most inscrutable. 
While the Board attempted to justify its reversal of Epilepsy 
Foundation based on changed workplace conditions, 52 it might instead have 
grounded its decision on a more straightforward rationale: this is simply an 
issue on which the Board has vacillated over the years, and the current 
Board believes that DuPont is the better result. 53 Certainly, the Board has 
"changed its mind" several times regarding the extension of the Weingarten 
right to nonunion employees, and courts may defer to the Board 
notwithstanding the vacillations.54 Indeed, when the D.C. Circuit reviewed 
Epilepsy Foundation the petitioners argued that the Board had not 
adequately explained the decision and had diverged from its DuPont 
holding. The court did not think the level of deference should be 
diminished by the shifting positions of the Board: 
An otherwise reasonable interpretation of § 7 is not made legally infirm 
because the Board gives renewed, rather than new, meaning to a disputed 
50. The dissent ridiculed that reason: "[W]e would hope that the American workplace has not yet 
become a new front in the war on terrorism and that the Board would not be leading the charge, 
unbidden by other authorities." IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at"' 28 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, 
dissenting). 
51. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh 'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945) 
(upholding conviction of American citizen of Japanese ancestry for violating order excluding persons of 
Japanese ancestry from West Coast military area). Recent debate about limitation of civil liberties based 
on national security concerns has focused on the Patriot Act. See, e.g., James B. Corney, Fighting 
Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 U. RicH. L. REv. 403 (2006). 
52. Nonunion Workers Lose Weingarten Right, Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH), No. 867, at 2 (July 
28, 2004) (quoting Professor Joan Flynn). 
53. !d. 
54. In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., the Supreme Court commented on deference to 
the Board even when the Board changes positions: "[A) Board rule is entitled to deference even if it 
represents a departure from the Board's prior policy." 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990) (citing NLRB v. J. 
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975)). 
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statutory provision. It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain substantive 
provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate with the changing 
compositions of the Board. Because the Board's new interpretation is 
reasonable under the Act, it is entitled to deference . 
. . . The Board's conclusion obviously is debatable (because the Board 
has "changed its mind" several times in addressing this issue); but the 
rationale underlying the decision in this case is both clear and reasonable. 
That is all that is necessary to gamer deference from the court. . . . The 
[petitioner's] challenge here is merely an attack on the wisdom of the 
agency's policy, and, therefore, the challenge must fai1.55 
Based on the Board's history with the Weingarten right in nonunion 
settings, one reaction to IBM Corp. is to say simply that the Board has 
changed its mind again and that this is neither surprising nor a big deal. 
Another reaction to the IBM Corp. opinion is that the majority did less to 
narrow section 7 rights than the approach advanced by the concurrence 
would have because the majority agreed that both interpretations of section 
7 are permissible and only overturned Epilepsy Foundation on policy 
grounds. 
However, despite purportedly limiting the nature of its holding and 
despite the history of the Board's position on this issue, two aspects of the 
majority opinion cause concern regarding the narrowing of section 7. First, 
the majority had no qualms about overturning a recent Board decision even 
when it represented a permissible interpretation of the Act. 56 Second, the 
majority opted for a narrower interpretation of section 7 when an 
interpretation of the NLRA raised the specter of employer liability under 
other laws. Why did the Board let potential employer liability under other 
laws influence it to adopt a narrower interpretation of section 7 of the 
NLRA? Employers may face conflicting obligations under the various 
labor and employment laws, and it is appropriate for the Board to take these 
considerations into account in interpreting section 7. These overlapping 
and conflicting obligations do pose problems and challenges for 
employers.57 Still, there is cause for concern when the Board reaches a 
55. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 & 1 1 02 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002). 
56. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Board's rulings are entitled to deference even when 
the Board changes positions. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. Still, some courts have shown 
impatience with the Board's vacillations. See, e.g., Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203, 
209-12 (5th Cir. 2001); Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1 5 14 (D.C. Cir. 1991)  (Mikva, J., 
dissenting) ("[A] a reviewing court should accord the Board's vacillating interpretations of the Act no 
particular deference."). One could speculate that the Board may, at some point, risk the deference that i t  
should receive from courts when interpreting the Act, but that is speculation. 
57. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 
NEB. L. REV. 7 , 1 8-19 ( 1 988) ("One can scarcely imagine an arrangement better designed to hold out 
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decision like IBM Corp. and narrowly interprets the law it is charged with 
enforcing. IBM Corp. begs the question of whether the Board accurately 
assessed potential employer liability under Title VII and other laws. 58 On 
this point, the dissent correctly pointed out that the majority did not 
adequately explain the peril to sexual harassment investigations posed by 
extension of the Weingarten right.59 Further, even if the Board's 
interpretation of the potential liability of employers under other laws was 
accurate, one could also ask whether the Board should resolve the conflict 
by narrowly interpreting the NLRA. In my view, the Board should not 
restrictively interpret the NLRA just to avoid potential problems for 
employers under other laws. The Board should enforce the NLRA and not 
spend as much time theorizing about potential conflicts with laws outside of 
its jurisdiction. If a conflict develops between the NLRA and other laws in 
ways that either pose difficulties for employers or jeopardize important 
federal policy, the courts or Congress can act as a check and make 
adjustments. 60 
Further, the concurrence causes additional concern about limiting 
section 7 rights for union and nonunion workers. At first glance, the 
concurrence's insistence that proof of the concerted nature of the conduct 
should be required rather than presumed does not necessarily seem 
unreasonable. However, when the concurrence's narrow interpretation of 
what qualifies as concerted is considered with the Board's decision in 
Holling Press which, as discussed below, narrowly interprets what qualifies 
as "for mutual aid or protection" you suddenly have an NLRA that applies 
to a very small range of activity. Further, the concurring opinion's 
insistence on the common law prerogatives of the employer in the absence 
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog the legal 
machinery."); Hodges, supra note 16, at 608. 
58. See Hodges, supra note 16, at 605-06 (questioning whether agency considering another law 
will accurately interpret that law and even if so, whether it will have a "nuanced understanding of the 
legal implications of its interpretation"). 
59. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at * 28 (June 9, 2004) (Liebman and 
Walsh, dissenting). 
60. The Federal Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court can review decisions of the Board and 
determine whether the Board is properly resolving conflicts between the NLRA and other e!llployment 
laws. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) & (f) (2006). For example, the Supreme Court has considered cases in which 
the breadth of the Board's discretion to fashion remedies for violations of the NLRA was at issue 
because of possible conflict with other laws. The Supreme Court considered a case in which it decided 
that the Board had overstepped its jurisdiction in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 533 U.S. 
137 (2002). In that case, the Board ordered a backpay award to an undocumented alien worker who was 
discharged by his employer for supporting a union. The Court held that the Board's generally broad 
discretion to order remedies for violations of the NLRA is limited by federal immigration policy 
evidenced in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. In contrast, the Supreme Court upheld 
the Board's award of backpay to an employee who committed peijury at a compliance proceeding in 
ABF Freight, System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994). 
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of a collective bargaining agreement suggests that Member Schaumber sees 
little role for the NLRA in the nonunion workplace. 
In extending the Weingarten right to nonunion employees, Epilepsy 
Foundation, like Materials Research, provided a significant statement 
regarding the broad applicability of section 7 rights to nonunion employees. 
The Board's reversal of Epilepsy Foundation in IBM Corp., although 
perhaps not that important practically-most nonunion employees probably 
never knew they possessed the Weingarten right and employers did not 
have an obligation to advise them of the right61:.._serves as a symbolically 
meaningful restriction of section 7 rights that leaves out nonunion 
employees.62 This restriction makes the NLRA less relevant as a broad 
source for worker protection. 
III. 
HOLLING PRESS: NARROWING MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION 
In Holling Press, a 2- 1 panel decision, an employee complained to her 
union steward that a supervisor had sexually harassed her. The union and 
employer investigated, and both determined that the complaint was 
meritless. The complainant then contacted the state fair employment 
practice agency. When another employee at the company mentioned that a 
supervisor had made a sexually charged statement to her, the complainant 
asked the coworker and another employee to testify before the state agency. 
She added that if they refused to testify they could be subpoenaed. On 
learning of the employee's request that coworkers testify on her behalf, the 
company first suspended her for threatening them and then terminated her 
for trying "to coerce coworkers into collaborating an unsubstantiated charge 
of sexual harassment."63 The employee then filed an unfair labor practice 
charge. The ALJ assigned to the case concluded that the employee's 
conduct was not concerted within the meaning of section 7 because it was 
not undertaken for mutual aid or protection and therefore dismissed the 
charge. The Board then took the case on review. 
61. See, e.g., Carlton J. Snow, Collective Agreements and Individual Contracts in Labor Law, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 3 1 9, 341 (2002) ("It is reasonable to conjecture that the vast majority of non-union 
workers in the United States have no knowledge of their Weingarten rights."); Nonunion Workers Lose 
Weingarten Right, supra note 52 (quoting Professors Charles Craver and Joan Flynn). 
62. In a case decided in 2005, the Board held that nonunion employees engaged in 12-hour 
peaceful work stoppage in their employer's parking lot were not protected by the NLRA because the 
employees section 7 rights were outweighed by the employer's property interest. Quietflex Manuf. Co., 
344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 30, 2005 WL 1564870 (June 30, 2005). Dissenting, Member Liebman cited IBM 
Corp. for the proposition that there is "a continuing erosion of the Section 7 rights of unorganized 
workers." !d. at *II & n.5 (Liebman, member, dissenting). 
63. Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662, at *I (Oct. 15, 2004). 
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A. The Majority: Distinguishing Collective 
and Individual Objectives 
37 
The majority initially disagreed with the ALJ and found that the 
conduct at issue was concerted because the employee appealed to another 
for help.64 However, the majority upheld the dismissal of the charge. The 
majority stressed that the two requirements for section 7 protection­
"concerted" and "for mutual aid or protection"-were separate and distinct 
inquiries and that each must be satisfied.65 The majority saw the 
complaining employee's aggressive language toward her co-workers and 
the other employees' lack of interest in helping with the case as indicative 
that no mutual purpose existed. Instead, the Board found that the 
complainant had pursued the claim only to benefit herself.66 The majority 
rejected the argument that her conduct was for mutual aid or protection 
because it might spare other employees from future sexual harassment. The 
Board stated, "The bare possibility that the second employee may one day 
suffer similar treatment, and may herself seek help, is far too speculative a 
basis on which to rest a finding of mutual aid or protection."67 
The majority's decision to deny section 7 protection to the employee in 
Holling Press raised a potential conflict with Board precedent. As just 
discussed, the Board in IBM Corp. had reiterated the validity of the 
Weingarten rule, namely that, at least in a union setting, an employee's 
request for co-employee accompaniment at an investigatory interview was 
protected conduct under section 7. The Holling Press majority needed to 
show why a request to have a co-worker employee at an investigatory 
interview was for mutual aid or protection, but a request to have an 
employee to testify in a hearing by a state agency investigating sexual 
harassment was not. 
The majority distinguished these scenarios on two grounds. First, the 
majority argued that a request to have a coworker present at a workplace 
investigation that may to lead to discipline is substantially different than 
asking to have a co-worker testify at a hearing on your behalf. The former 
satisfies the mutual aid prong of section 7 because discipline is an issue that 
affects all employees, and it is likely that any coworker being asked to 
provide accompaniment may herself be subjected to such an investigation 
in the future. By contrast, the majority claimed that sexual harassment 
claims are more uncommon and it is unlikely that the coworker will herself 
64. /d. at "'2. 
65. !d. at • t ,  '"3. 
66. /d. at •3. 
67. !d. at •4. 
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be subjected to sexual harassment in the future.68 Thus, the majority 
claimed that there was not the same level of mutual interest or need for 
mutual aid when an employee asks another worker to testify at a hearing. 
Second, the majority stated that requests for accompaniment are more likely 
to be for mutual benefit when made in the context of internal investigations 
for the simple reason that internal workplace investigations are more 
common than external suits or charges.69 
Perhaps recognizing that the decision may deprive all employees 
pursuing sexual harassment claims of section 7 protection, the majority 
stated in a footnote that the complaining employee who solicited coworker 
testimony might be protected by other laws.70 The majority seemed to be 
saying its restrictive interpretation of section 7 was not a problem in the 
context of sexual harassment because other laws provide adequate 
protection for employees seeking assistance from their co-workers. As in 
IBM Corp. the majority thus chose to see the NLRA as applying only in a 
narrow range of circumstances. 
B. The Dissent: Civility Not Required 
The dissent argued that the majority' s  interpretation of the "mutual aid 
or protection" prong of section 7 departed from the established rule that 
conduct or complaints need only involve terms or conditions of 
employment to be protected.71 The fact that only one employee may have 
raised a claim of sexual harassment was relevant to establishing 
concertedness, but not to mutual aid or protection.72 Since the majority 
found that the employee satisfied the concertedness prong, the dissent took 
issue with the majority's claim that sexual harassment allegations were not 
about the general terms and conditions of employment. The dissent labeled 
as "absurd" the proposition that sexual harassment and other forms of 
illegal discrimination are too rare to be a matter of mutual interest among 
employees.73 While acknowledging that the conduct of the complaining 
employee was not laudable, the dissent stated that "Section 7 requires 
neither altruism, nor unequivocal solidarity, on the part of an individual 
employee who seeks help from coworkers with respect to working 
conditions."74 Rather, since the employee's requests to her co-workers were 
about an issue that clearly involved the terms and conditions of 
68. /d. at *5. 
69. /d. 
70. /d. at *4 n. l 7 . 
71 .  /d.  at *7 (Liebman, Member, dissenting). 
72. /d. at *6. 
73. /d. at *7. 
74. !d. at *8. 
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employment, the requests were for mutual aid or protection, and, thus, her 
conduct was protected by section 7. 
C. Critiquing Holling Press 
The majority's suggestion that mutuality depends on the frequency of 
the type of conduct and any attendant investigation and its supposition that 
sexual harassment and related investigations are rare and isolated is difficult 
to understand. This is particularly true because IBM Corp. used the 
employer's need to conduct investigations into allegations of harassment as 
a basis to overturn existing precedent and deny the Weingarten right to 
nonunion employees. The Holling Press majority struggled to distinguish 
IBM Corp. on the ground that sexual harassment allegations lacked a 
mutual interest for all employees. Yet, the decisions provide an interesting 
juxtaposition: in IBM Corp., the Board found that an employers' need to 
conduct sexual harassment investigations was a sufficient reason to deny 
the Weingarten right to nonunion employees and to restrictively interpret 
section 7; while in Holling Press the Board claimed that the infrequency of 
sexual harassment and attendant investigations was a sufficient reason to 
deny section 7 protection to a union employee. These decisions beg the 
question: Are sexual harassment investigations common occurrences such 
that the NLRA should be interpreted to facilitate them, or are they so rare 
that the NLRA is irrelevant and employees can be left to the protection of 
other laws? Instead of allowing the NLRA to be a basis for general worker 
protection, the Holling Press decision narrowed section 7 rights and left 
aggressive employees who irritate their co-employees with their requests or 
demands for help, to the possible protection of other laws. 
In my earlier article, I stated that the controlling interpretation of "for 
mutual aid or protection" was broad enough to cover much conduct.75 
Indeed, I argued that in the nonunion setting proving concertedness posed 
the greatest obstacle to coverage of nonunion workers.76 Holling Press has 
changed my · assessment. As the majority suggests, at least in cases 
involving grievances or complaints by employees, satisfying the 
concertedness requirement does not assure section 7 coverage. In a post­
Rolling Press case with similar facts, an administrative law judge 
concluded that an employee' s  allegations of sexual harassment were her 
concern alone and not for mutual aid or protection.77 
While Holling Press dealt mainly with the mutuality requirement, it 
may also have some influence in cases in which concertedness is the focus. 
75. Corbett, supra note 7, at 282-83. 
76. /d. at 279. 
77. Charles Schwab & Co, Inc., Case 28-CA-19445JD(SF)-79-04, 2004 WL 3023 761 , at * 1 1  
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Dec. 1 6, 2004). 
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It seems that employees who assert complaints against their employers may 
fail to establish coverage under either or both of the section 7 
requirements-concertedness or for mutual aid or protection. In Abramson, 
LLC, for example, a contract employee filed, in the midst of a union 
organizing campaign, a complaint with the EEOC alleging discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. 78 When the employee sought to return to work after 
being in the hospital for a short period, the employer proceeded to ask him 
for the papers he filed with the EEOC. When the employee acknowledged 
signing the papers, the employer told him that there was no work available. 
In reviewing the employee's claim that he was terminated for engaging in 
protected section 7 activity, the Board cited Holling Press for the 
proposition that both prongs of section 7 must be satisfied for conduct to be 
protected. The majority concluded that the conduct was not concerted 
because there was no evidence that the employee discussed his concerns 
underlying his EEOC charge with other employees or sought their 
assistance. Rather, he was engaged in a "personal campaign."79 Thus, the 
employer's asking questions about unprotected conduct was not an unfair 
labor practice under section 8(a)(l)  because it did not interfere with the 
employee's exercise of his section 7 rights. Although Holling Press was 
decided on the basis of no mutual aid or protection, it was invoked in 
Abramson to buttress a finding of no concertedness. 
I noted in my earlier article that Professor Cynthia Estlund and others 
had criticized the then-controlling interpretation of for mutual aid or 
protection as too narrow because it required a "traditional self-interested 
economic objective."80 Notwithstanding that criticism, I argued that Board 
precedent established that the scope of for mutual aid or protection was 
broad enough to cover many types of employee conduct, including 
expressing or communicating views about employment conditions, 
challenging rules that restrict employee communications, and speaking out 
against employers.81 Now, Holling Press makes clear that the meaning of 
mutual aid or protection has been narrowed and can exclude individual 
complaints about workplace conditions; ironically, self interest of the 
employee now seems to be a basis for finding lack of mutual aid or 
protection. 
78. 345 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 2005 WL 2094928 at *3 (Aug. 26, 2005). 
79. Jd. at *4. 
80. Corbett, supra note 7, at 283 (quoting Cynthia Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee 
Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 92 1 ,  928 (1 992) and citing Richard Michael Fischl, Self. Others, and Section 7: Mutualism 
and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 8 1 6-
1 9  ( 1989)). 
81 .  See Corbett, supra note 7, at 286-96. 
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IV. 
LUTHERAN HERITAGE VILLA GE-LIVONIA HOME, INC. : NARROWING 
RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYER RULES 
4 1  
One of the ways in which the NLRA provides protection to both union 
and nonunion employees is by declaring employer rules restricting 
communications among employees unlawful as unfair labor practices. In 
my prior article, I discussed the Board's analysis of such rules as 
established by Lafayette Park Hotel. 82 In that decision, the Board held that 
the mere maintenance of anti-communication rules may be an unfair labor 
practice in violation of section 8(a)(l)  without regard to their application if 
they are likely to have a chilling effect on section 7 rights. I also discussed 
several Board and court decisions in which the Board and some courts had 
found employer prohibitory rules to violate section 8(a)(1).83 In one case I 
discussed, Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, NA., Inc. , the 
Board used the Lafayette Park Hotel analysis and found that an employer's 
rule prohibiting "abusive or threatening language" was an unfair labor 
practice.84 However, the D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's 
order, calling it "simply preposterous" to interpret the NLRA as prohibiting 
employers from maintaining civility in the workplace. 85 
In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia Home, Inc.,86 a 3-2 decision, the 
Board, while not expressly abrogating the analysis of Lafayette Park Hotel, 
evaluated employer rules restricting employee conduct differently than 
other Board decisions. The Board embraced the D.C. Circuit's analysis in 
Adtranz and suggested that it might have reached a different result in 
Lafayette Park HatelY The Lutheran Heritage decision signals an easing 
of NLRA restrictions on at least certain types of employer rules regarding 
employee communications. After Lutheran Heritage, rules that restrict 
aggressive, hostile, or offensive speech are likely to be upheld under the 
rationale that employees would not understand them as restricting speech 
protected by section 7. 
A. The Majority: Rules to Ensure a Civil, Decent, 
and Harassment-Free Workplace 
In Lutheran Heritage, the Board considered a number of rules 
maintained by an employer. The Board held that the rules prohibiting 
82. 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998), enforced sub nom. Lafayette Park Hotel v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 52 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
83. Corbett, supra note 7, at 291-95. 
84. 3 3 1  N.L.R.B. 291,  293 (2000), enforcement denied, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
85. Adtranz, 253 F.3d at 28. 
86. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 (Nov. 1 9, 2004). 
87. !d. at *5 n.9 ("We do not pass on the validity of Lafayette Park Hotel . . .  insofar as it held 
unlawful a rule prohibiting 'false, vicious, profane or malicious statements."'). 
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"abusive and profane language," "harassment," and "verbal, mental and 
physical abuse" were lawful. Finding that the rules by their terms did hot 
explicitly restrict conduct protected by section 7, the Board then turned to 
whether employees could reasonably construe the rules to prohibit section 7 
conduct, whether the employer promulgated the rules in response to union 
activity, or whether the employer applied the rules in ways to restrict 
section 7 conduct.88 Focusing on the first prong, the Board followed the 
D.C. Circuit's Adtranz analysis and explained that these rules "serve 
legitimate business purposes: they are designed to maintain order in the 
workplace and to protect the [employer] from liability by prohibiting 
conduct that, if permitted, could result in such liability."89 The majority 
explained that reasonable employees would interpret the rules as 
"ensur[ing] a civil and decent workplace"90 and not as prohibiting section 7 
protected conduct. Specifically, regarding the rule prohibiting harassment, 
the majority stated that employees have a right to a workplace that is free of 
unlawful harassing conduct.91 The majority noted that its holding meant 
only that the maintenance of such rules was not an unfair labor practice and 
that applications of those rules to specific conduct might still be found to be 
an unfair labor practice. 
B. The Dissent: Civility Not Required by Section 7 
The Lutheran Heritage dissent acknowledged that employers have an 
interest in maintaining a civil workplace and avoiding liability for 
harassment under federal and state laws.92 However, the dissent argued that 
employees could interpret ambiguous rules in a way that placed them in 
tension with section 7 rights, and that those competing interests must be 
balanced. For example, the dissent argued that the rule's use of vague 
terms without examples could leave employees uncertain whether 
condemning a supervisor's treatment of a co-employee might run afoul of 
the prohibition of "abusive or profane language . . . directed toward a 
supervisor," or, whether using a word like "scab," a disparaging term often 
used by union supporters, might violate the prohibition of "abusive 
language." Responding to the Adtranz rationale that such rules are needed 
by employers to help them avoid liability for sexual and other prohibited 
harassment, the dissent pointed out that the employer had two rules 
prohibiting verbal abuse, and a separate rule (in addition to the general 
harassment rule) covering sexual harassment, rendering the general 
88. /d. at *2-3. 
89. !d. at *3. 
90. !d. 
9 1 .  !d. at *4. 
92. Lutheran Heritage, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 at *6 (Nov. 19, 2004) (Liebman 
and Walsh, Members, dissenting). 
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harassment rule inapplicable to sexual harassment. Accordingly, the dissent 
found the employer's rules to be overbroad.93 
The dissent took no consolation in the majority's assertion that 
application of the rules could be an unfair labor practice. The concern 
undergirding the Lafayette Park Hotel analysis is that the mere maintenance 
of such rules chills protected activity.94 The dissent would have rejected the 
Adtranz analysis, which had not previously been accepted by the Board. 
When workplace terms and conditions are the subject, the dissent noted, 
tempers sometimes flare, and "[s]ection 7 is not limited to amiable or 
decorous communications. "95 
C. Critiquing Lutheran Heritage 
By accepting the D.C. Circuit's Adtranz analysis, the Board majority 
clearly diverged from its recent precedents analyzing employer rules 
prohibiting workplace conduct and communications. In focusing on 
employer concerns with maintaining a civil and decent workplace and 
avoiding liability, this decision is similar to IBM Corp. Both cases balance 
the employee's right to engage in section 7 activity with the employer's 
concerns about other legal restrictions and potential liability by narrowing 
the scope of NLRA protection and easing the burden on employers. 
According to the Board, employers can adopt broad restrictive rules without 
fear of violating the NLRA. 
The few Board decisions dealing with rules prohibiting certain 
workplace conduct since Lutheran Heritage have produced mixed results. 
On the one hand, in three decisions, Fiesta Hotel Corp.,96 Guardsmark,97 
and Stanadyne Automotive Corp.,98 the Board applied Lutheran Heritage to 
uphold employer rules restricting employee communication or conduct. In 
Fiesta Hotel Corp. the Board found that a rule that prohibited employees 
from engaging in "conduct which is or has the effect of being injurious, 
offensive, threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with [other 
employees]" was valid.99 As in Lutheran Heritage, the dissent cautioned 
that the decision "threatens to allow employers to take advantage of the 
chilling effect of ambiguous rules."100 In Guardsmark, the Board applied 
Lutheran Heritage to find lawful an employer rule prohibiting fraternization 
on- or off-duty and dating or becoming overly friendly with a client's 
93. !d. at *8. 
94. !d. at *6-7. 
95. !d. at *9. 
96. 344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 59, 2005 WL 1 9 1 85977, at *7 (Aug. 1 5, 2005). 
97. 344 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 2005 WL 1 3 78568 (June 7, 2005). 
98. 345 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 2005 WL 23421 1 1  (Aug. 24, 2005). 
99. Fiesta Hotel Corp., 2005 WL 1 9 1 85977, at * I .  
1 00. !d. at * 1 2  (Liebman, Member, dissenting). 
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employees or co-employees. The dissent found that the inclusion of the 
anti-fraternization provision rendered the rule susceptible to an 
interpretation that it prohibited conduct protected by section 7. 101 
In Stanadyne Automotive, the president and CEO of the company made 
a statement in a meeting with employees during a union organizing 
campaign in which he said that he understood that some union supporters 
were harassing fellow employees, that employees could be for the company 
or the union, but that "no one should be harassed [and] [h]arassment of any 
type is :not tolerated by this company and will be dealt with."102 The 
president' s  statements were initially found to constitute an unfair labor 
practice because his language was so broad that employees could 
reasonably believe that conduct protected by section 7 would come within 
the term harassment and would not be tolerated. Applying the Lutheran 
Heritage analysis, the Board majority reversed the ALJ. Invoking the threat 
of employer liability under other laws, the Board said, "In view of the 
various State and Federal laws that place affirmative obligations upon 
employers to address workplace harassment, an employer reasonably would 
react to reports of harassment by informing employees that such conduct 
will not be tolerated."103 The majority then held that the rule was not 
promulgated in response to union activity and that employees would not 
reasonably understand the rule against harassment as prohibiting section 7 
protected conduct. 104 The dissent disagreed with the majority on both the 
purpose behind the promulgation of the rule and the reasonable 
understanding of the employees. 105 
On the other hand, the Board has also applied Lutheran Heritage to 
strike down employer rules. In Cintas Corp. the Board invalidated a rule 
requiring confidentiality of various types of information, such as 
information concerning the company, its business plans, its partners, new 
business efforts, customers, accounting, and financial matters. 1 06 The Board 
held that the rule's "unqualified prohibition of the release of 'any 
information' regarding 'its partners' could be reasonably construed by 
employees to restrict discussion of wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment with their fellow employees and with the Union."107 In KSL 
Claremont Resort, Inc., the Board found that a rule prohibiting "negative 
conversations" about associates or managers also unfairly restricted 
1 0 1 .  Guardsmark, 2005 W L  1 3 78568, at *8 (Liebman, Member, dissenting). 
102. Stanadyne Automotive Corp., 2005 WL 2342 1 1 1 ,  at *3. 
1 03. /d. at *4. 
104. Stanadyne Automotive Corp., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 2005 WL 2342 1 1  at *4 (Aug. 24, 2005). 
105. /d. at * 1 3  (Liebman, Member, dissenting in part). 
106. 344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 1 8, 2005 WL 1 564863 (June 30, 2005). 
1 07. /d. at * I .  
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employee rights. 108 These cases suggest that, notwithstanding the broad 
deference accorded employers in developing and maintaining workplace 
rules under Lutheran Heritage, rules that can reasonably be understood to 
prohibit employees' discussions of wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment will still be unlawful. 
While some rules have been struck down, the approach advocated by 
Lutheran Heritage makes broad rules prohibiting certain types of 
communications and conduct by employees toward other employees more 
likely to survive an unfair labor practice charge. It is predictable that 
employers, with the imprimatur of the NLRB, will adopt and maintain such 
rules and that employees will be disciplined for their violation. While 
Holling Press insulates employers who discipline employees on an ad hoc 
basis for aggressive or hostile communications, Lutheran Heritage insulates 
employers who adopt prophylactic rules regarding such conduct. Together 
these Board decisions make it more difficult for employees to associate and 
to discuss problems of mutual concern if such discussions may at times be 
heated or uncivil. This is a troubling approach because the Board should 
know that the history of labor relations demonstrates that employee 
interactions about terms and conditions of employment often do not 
resemble polite parlor talk. It is predictable that the decisions and the 
Board's new elevation of civility over employee communication will have a 
chilling effect on expression and communication. 
v. 
POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE THREE DECISIONS: NARROWING 
SECTION 7 RIGHTS 
Are these three decisions harbingers of the demise of the NLRA or just 
three Board decisions in which the Republican and Democratic members of 
the Board disagreed? While it is too soon to predict the full ramifications 
and impact of these three Board decisions, it is clear that these decisions, as 
long as they stand, narrow the scope of section 7 rights for employees 
represented by a union and render the NLRA less applicable to nonunion 
employees. 
All three decisions involved the relationship between the NLRA and 
other laws, principally federal and state anti-discrimination laws, and in 
each case the Board interpreted the NLRA narrowly and left the employee 
without a remedy. In IBM Corp. and Lutheran Heritage employers took 
actions that conceivably might help them avoid liability under 
discrimination laws. The Board majority restricted the scope of the NLRA 
in order to enable employers to meet their obligations and assuage their 
108. 344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 05, 2005 WL 1452400, at *I  (June 16, 2005). 
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concerns under these other laws. Holling Press presents a different pattern. 
There an employee made claims under state discrimination laws, and when 
she was fired for aggressively soliciting a co-employee to assist her with 
her harassment claim she sought protection under the NLRA. Just as it did 
in the other cases, the Board narrowly interpreted the NLRA to help 
employers either avoid possible liability to meet supposed obligations under 
discrimination laws. 
Another feature common to the three decisions is their treatment of 
civility and decorum in the workplace. Lack of civility and respect for 
other people has been an important topic of discussion in our society in 
recent years. 1 09 One facet of that broader discussion is how these issues 
impact the workplace. l l0 In Holling Press, the Board used the aggressive 
nature of the employee's solicitation for help to classify her conduct as 
benefiting only herself and not for mutual aid or protection. In Lutheran 
Heritage, the Board discussed the right of employers to establish a "civil 
and decent work place" and permited the adoption of a broad prophylactic 
rule to help accomplish that objective. In IBM Corp., the Board sought to 
help employers investigate claims of harassment by removing the legal 
protection for nonunion employees who assist each other during such 
investigations. The dissent in Lutheran Heritage responded to this 
solicitude for civility by declaring that section 7 protected conduct is not 
always "amiable and decorous," 1 1 1  and the dissent in Holling Press 
protested that section 7 "requires neither altruism, nor unequivocal 
solidarity."1 12 
The point of this essay is not that the Board is reaching ridiculous 
results or trying to hurt employees. IBM Corp. is a return to a position the 
Board has taken before, and even though I disagree with the decisions in 
109. The most discussed recent survey regarding Americans' attitudes about incivility is one 
conducted by Public Agenda and funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts. PUBLIC AGENDA, 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: A STATUS REPORT ON RUDENESS IN AMERJCA (2002); see also James 
Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, I 09 YALE L.J. 1 279, 1280 (2000) ("It has 
become common, over the last decade or so, to plead for more 'civility' and 'respect ' in American daily 
life."). 
I 10. See, e.g., Symposium on Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 235 (2004); Anita 
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, I l l  HARV. L. REv. 445, 450 ( 1 997); Catherine L. 
Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (200 1 ); David C. Yamada, The 
Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying " and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment 
Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000); Marilyn Elias, Study: Rudeness is Poisoning U.S. Workplace, USA 
TODAY, June I 4, 200 1 ,  at D I ;  Pat Karlak, RUDE, RUDE, RUDE: Workplace Incivility Is on the Rise 
and Companies Are Taking Notice, CHJ . DAILY HERALD, Feb. 27, 2001,  Suburban Living, at I ;  Effects 
of Workplace Incivility Widespread, Likely to Linger, Research Study Concludes, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. I 1 7, at A-4 (June 19, 2001). 
1 J  I .  Lutheran Heritage, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 at *9 (Nov. I 9, 2004) (Liebman 
and Walsh, Members, dissenting). 
1 1 2. Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662, at *8 (Oct. 15, 2004) (Liebman, 
Member, dissenting). 
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Holling Press and Lutheran Heritage, they do not seem beyond the pale of 
reason to me. However, taking the three decisions together, I see the Board 
narrowing the section 7 rights of employees and thus narrowing protection 
under the NLRA. Although this is true for both union and nonunion 
employees, it is even more so for nonunion employees. 
With these three decisions, the vision I had of an NLRA that could 
provide important rights and protections to nonunion employees is blurring. 
And with it, the relevance of the Act in the workplaces of the twenty-first 
century, which are predominantly nonunion,113 and in the overall 
employment law regime of the United States is waning. The agency 
charged with interpreting and enforcing the National Labor Relations Act is 
narrowing and marginalizing it. Although there can be good reasons for 
narrow interpretations of laws, I question whether the Board has given good 
reasons in these cases. In each decision the Board elevates employers' 
desires to avoid liability under other laws and to ensure civility and 
decorum in the workplace and subordinates the rights of workers to engage 
in protected concerted activity for mutual aid or protection-the rights which 
Congress entrusted to the Board for interpretation and enforcement. As 
important as the employers' goals are, the objectives of the NLRA also are 
important, and they should extend to employees engaged in section 7 
conduct, regardless of whether they are represented by a union. If the 
National Labor Relations Board does not proclaim the importance of the 
National Labor Relations Act and elevate it above other laws with which it 
might conflict who will? 
1 13. Supra note 4. 
